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The Maastricht inflation criterion, designed in the early 1990s to bring “high-inflation” EU 
countries into line with “low-inflation” countries prior to the introduction of the euro, poses 
challenges for both new EU member countries and the European Central Bank. While the 
criterion has positively influenced the public stance toward low inflation, it has biased the 
choice of the disinflation strategy toward short-run, fiat measures—rather than adopting 
structural reforms with longer-term benefits—with unpleasant consequences for the 
efficiency of the eurozone transmission mechanism. The criterion is also unnecessarily tight 
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Nontechnical Summary 
As part of the process toward monetary union, countries were required to fulfill three criteria, set 
out in the Treaty of Maastricht. One of them required countries to achieve one-year inflation of no 
more than 1½ percent above the average inflation rate of the three European Union (EU) member 
states with the most stable prices.  The purpose of this criterion was to bring high-inflation EU 
countries in line with low-inflation countries before the euro was introduced.  Although the 
criterion has achieved its aim of narrowing the inflation gap between EU countries, it has also 
encouraged countries to adopt short-run, fiat measures to reduce inflation rather than structural 
reforms with longer-term economic benefits. The study examines what implications this may have 
for the 10 new EU member countries, all of which are hoping to join monetary union in the near 
future. 
From a purely numerical perspective, the Maastricht inflation criterion was a great success: the 
inflation differential between low- and high-inflation countries, which was in the double digits 
from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, started to narrow in the early 1990s, declining to 2–
3  percentage points by 1997. But from a policy perspective, it had some unintended 
consequences. To meet the criterion, EU member countries were faced with two choices to adopt 
credible monetary policy and market-oriented reforms that reduced inflation on a more permanent 
basis or opt for short-term measures, such as changes in regulated prices and indirect taxes and 
other measures that reduced demand, and forced wage moderation.  
In the late 1990s, in their rush to adopt the euro, all EU members relied at least partly on short-
term measures, leaving their goods and factor markets unreformed. Once the effect of these 
measures faded, however, inflation accelerated again in most countries. While the strategy of “low 
inflation now, reforms later” may have modest short-term costs, the long-term costs are high. The 
monetary policy transmission mechanism is likely to be less efficient and economic agents 
continue to base their decisions on expectations of higher inflation. This makes future disinflation 
more costly. In contrast, countries that implemented more long term structural reforms now 
benefit from flexible markets and expectations of low inflation going forward.  
What does the experience of the old EU member countries imply for the new members (Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and 
Slovakia)? The simulation shows that countries with unreformed economies are likely to face 
much steeper costs when they try to bring down inflation in the future. This result holds for both 
the current euro zone members and new member countries. The latter would benefit from an 
inflation criterion that makes the choice of a short-term disinflation strategy less appealing. At 
present, the short, 12-month testing period of the Maastricht inflation criterion may  encourage  
use of the fiat strategy. A longer testing period, perhaps covering the full business cycle, might be 
preferable.  The tightness of the inflation criterion also provides a further incentive for one-off 
measures. These incentives could be alleviated by excluding countries with negative output gaps 
from the calculation of the criterion. 
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“And I shall sing about that second realm 
where man’s soul goes to purify itself 
and become worthy to ascend to Heaven.” 
Dante; The Divine Comedy, Purgatorio, Canto I 
 
1. Introduction 
The Maastricht inflation criterion—inflation of no more than 1½ percent above the average 
inflation rate of the three European Union (EU) member states with the most stable prices—was 
designed in the early 1990s to bring such “high-inflation” countries as Italy and the United 
Kingdom into line with such “low-inflation” countries as Germany and the Netherlands prior to 
the introduction of the euro. While the inflation criterion motivated all-European inflation 
convergence in the late 1990s, it did not prevent an acceleration of inflation in several countries 
after their entry into the eurozone. What can the new EU member countries (NMCs) do to 
minimize the compliance cost of this criterion?
1  
Assessments of the Maastricht inflation criterion—by the European Union (European 
Commission, 2004), the IMF (Schadler, 2005), national central banks (Bárta, 2006), and this 
study—point to modest costs associated with the criterion, which are promised to be further 
ameliorated by the “flexibility” of the European Central Bank (ECB) in dealing with new member 
countries. The “temporal punishment” for past inflation sins, purgatory, seems low. Furthermore, 
history has shown that the criterion can be fulfilled with a healthy dose of administrative 
measures. There are, however, differences between the 1990s and 2000s. 
Unlike the old EU member countries, which were mimicking the then “engine of Europe,” 
Germany, and the most credible central bank, the NMCs are asked to match the performance of 
three countries that have in common only that they are in the downturn phase of their business 
cycles. A tight one-year inflation criterion may motivate the authorities to pursue fiat disinflation 
policies of short-term demand stabilization and government intervention at the expense of long-
term structural reforms that would create a low-inflation environment (Ozkan, Sibert, and 
Sutherland, 2004). For example, a country may opt for a temporary wage freeze as opposed to 
liberalizing its labor market. The resulting monetary transmission distortions and inefficiencies 
are likely to increase the cost of future disinflations and complicate ECB policymaking for years 
to come.  
The contribution of the paper is to link pre-euro disinflation strategies with the costs of future 
disinflations in nine calibrated country models. The results suggest that in countries that choose 
the fiat disinflation strategy of “low inflation now, reforms later” have modest short-term costs of 
disinflation, mostly attributable to “borrowed credibility” from the ECB. But their long-term costs 
are high, reflecting structural rigidities inherited from the past. In contrast, reformist countries 
benefit from flexible markets and forward looking agents, both of which push the disinflation cost 
                                                           
1 The “old” member countries (EU-15) comprise Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The 
new member countries consist of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
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down. Thus, the member countries would benefit from a criterion that makes to the choice of a 
fiat disinflation strategy less likely, either by calculating the criterion over the business cycle or by 
lengthening the evaluation period. 
This paper is organized as follows. First, we link EU inflation developments with inflation 
drivers. Second, we discuss the nexus between structural reforms and the monetary transmission 
mechanism in the EU. Third, we formulate a simple model, calibrate it for nine EU countries, and 
compute hypothetical output losses from disinflation policies. Finally, we discuss the policy 
implications of the Maastricht criterion for the conduct of monetary policy in the NMCs and by 
the ECB. 
2. Inflation in the European Union 
The concept of the new European monetary order was simple. Once exchange rates were 
stabilized and inflation rates had converged, the former would be irrevocably fixed and the latter 
would be controlled by pan-European monetary policy executed by the ECB. This plan worked 
reasonably well in the 1980s and 1990s, and inflation remained close to the target “of close to but 
below 2 percent” during the early 2000s. The Maastricht criterion failed, however, to close the 
differential between high- and low-inflation countries. 
2.1 The Role of the Maastricht Inflation Criterion 
The European Monetary Union (EMU) was set up as an institutional arrangement to foster low 
inflation. Developments in the 1970s showed that time inconsistent policies fueled by distorted 
labor markets, tax systems prone to inflation bias, and other structural impediments made it 
difficult to ensure a low-inflation environment in Europe. Thus, the EU imposed various entry 
criteria for the EMU—such as the Maastricht inflation criterion—to encourage the EU countries 
to undertake fundamental economic reforms prior to joining the EMU (see Annex 1 for additional 
details). Indeed, the inflation differential between low-inflation and high-inflation countries, 
which was in double digits from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, started to narrow in the early 
1990s, declining to 2–3 percentage points by 1997 (Figure 1). 
The Maastricht inflation criterion did motivate all-European inflation convergence, but the 
disinflation process was also facilitated by a secular decline in inflation. While the empirical 
literature is not entirely conclusive regarding the contribution of the criterion, it demonstrates that 
the criterion changed the preferences of the monetary authorities.
2 For example, it has been shown 
that the coefficient of policy aversion to inflation has increased (Cecchetti and Ehrmann, 1999; 
and Arestis and Mouratidis, 2004). The literature finds, however, a weak positive impact of 
structural reforms in the eurozone on the area’s inflation, mainly because of slow and insufficient 






                                                           
2 Some useful, if incomplete, reviews of the inflation convergence literature are those of Bini Smaghi (1994), 
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Figure 1:  EU-15: Inflation Developments, 1970–2005 1) 
(Annual inflation rate, in percent) 
 
 
Source: World Economic Outlook, authors' calculations. 
1) The EU-15 comprises Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. The eurozone excludes Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
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2.2 The Maastricht Inflation Criterion: Sinners and Saints 
The Maastricht inflation criterion is monitored and assessed only prior to the adoption of the euro, 
and each country is required to exhibit “saintly” inflation for at least one year. The  obvious 
question is then whether the Maastricht inflation criterion (and the EMU in general) have 
succeeded in permanently lowering inflation. Have all the sins been purged? 
Figure 2: Countries with Inflation above the Maastricht Inflation Criterion, 1999-2005 1/           
(Harmonized indices of consumer prices) 
















Source: Eurostat, authors’ calculations. 
1/ EU-15 comprises Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweeden, and United Kingdom. NMC-
10 comprises the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia.  
 
Following adoption of the euro, inflation in the three highest-inflation eurozone countries 
averaged 1  percentage point higher than what was required by the criterion specified for the 
member countries of the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM2) (Figure 2). On average, one 
in five EU-15 countries has recorded inflation at least 50 basis points above the Maastricht 
criterion. While this is far from the double-digit differentials seen in the 1970s and 1980s, under a 
fixed exchange rate regime such inflation still implies a long-term loss of price competitiveness 
unless it is compensated for by productivity growth. Inflation developments in the NMCs have 
varied and several countries have yet to converge to the level of the criterion (Latvia and 
Slovakia). The three highest-inflation NMCs have been missing the inflation criterion on average 
by 3.5 percentage points. Technically, of course, neither the eurozone countries nor the NMCs 
were bound by the criterion. It is the ECB that is responsible for inflation in the eurozone and 
none of the NMCs had to meet the criterion either, as they were not seeking to adopt the euro 
before 2006, although a few new member countries started to participate in the ERM2 
immediately after their accession.  The Maastricht Inflation Criterion: “Saints” and “Sinners”   7 
 
Which countries are the most frequent sinners, with inflation above the level implied by the 
Maastricht criterion? In the EU-15 group, Greece, Ireland, and Spain have had higher inflation, 
while among the NMCs the list includes Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia, and Slovenia 
(Table 1). Six of the EU-15 countries had inflation above the Maastricht criterion at some point 
during 2001–2005, each of them for at least one quarter. In contrast, every NMC substantially 
exceeded the criterion, although Lithuania and Malta did so only briefly. 
Table 1: EU Inflation Sinners 1/  










Greece 20 75 7 100
Spain 11 41 4 57
Ireland 17 64 1 14
Luxembourg (Grand-Duché) 7 27 4 57
Netherlands 8 31 0 0
Portugal 14 51 0 0
NMC-10
Czech Republic 11 40 0 0
Estonia 19 69 4 52
Cyprus 8 30 1 10
Latvia 9 32 7 95
Lithuania 2 6 0 0
H u n g a r y 2 71 0 0 71 0 0
Malta 6 22 1 19
Poland 17 64 4 57
Slovenia 26 98 6 90
Slovakia 27 100 7 100
1999-2005 2004-2005
 
Source: Eurostat, authors’ calculations. 
1/ The following countries’ inflation was not above the Maastricht criterion during these 
periods: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Finland, Sweden, and United 
Kingdom. 
2/ By at least 50 basis points in a month, the official “Maastricht” definition. 
  
The saints—that is, the countries that have comprised the base for calculating the Maastricht 
criterion—are not particularly happy campers either, as these countries have experienced 
substantial negative output gaps (Table 2).
3 Low inflation has come at a cost of GDP below its 
potential as the economies move along a short-run Phillips curve. The only two saints in the EU-
                                                           
3 Potential output is estimated by European Commission staff from a Cobb-Douglas production function estimate 
with trend total factor productivity (the AMECO database). 8   Aleš Bulíř and Jaromír Hurník  
 
15 group without a gap are France and the United Kingdom. The composition of the saints group 
changes—only five countries did not make it into the group for at least one quarter (Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Portugal). Four of the NMCs were temporarily a part of the reference 
group, typically also experiencing negative output gaps. 
Table 2: EU Inflation Saints 










Belgium 4 15 0 0
Denmark 5 20 5 76
Germany 18 67 1 19
France 8 30 0 0
Luxembourg (Grand-Duché) 2 7 0 0
Austria 7 25 1 19
Finland 8 30 7 100
Sweden 14 51 4 57
United Kingdom 14 51 0 5
NMC-10
Czech Republic 6 22 2 29
Estonia 1 4 1 14
Lithuania 17 64 4 52
Poland 4 16 1 14
1999-2005 2004-2005
 
Source: Eurostat, authors’ calculations. 
1/ The following countries’ inflation was not below the Low 3 reference inflation during these 
periods: Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Latvia, Hungary, Malta, 
Slovenia, and Slovakia. 
2/ The official “Maastricht” definition. 
 
2.3 Why Is Inflation in Some EU Countries Higher than in Others? 
Against the background of a stable average inflation rate in the EU-15 countries, inflation 
accelerated in several, mostly high-growth, economies. The dispersion of European inflation 
drifted upward after the drive toward the euro pushed it downward sharply in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. The differential between the three countries with the highest and lowest inflation 
rates fell from about 4 percent to less than 2 percent by 1997, only to stabilize between 2½ percent 
and 3 percent thereafter.  
The dispersion of inflation rates across member countries has introduced noise into the ECB 
policymaking process to the extent that the EU-wide inflation rate reflects an average of national 
inflation rates and may not reflect cyclical conditions in any given country. It seems clear that a 
low level of average inflation in the eurozone over time would not necessarily translate into a low The Maastricht Inflation Criterion: “Saints” and “Sinners”   9 
 
level of volatility across countries.
4 It could be argued that regional price volatility is irrelevant for 
stabilization policy in an optimal currency area, but the eurozone is not an optimal currency zone 
and is unlikely to become one soon (Babetskii et al., 2004; and Schadler et al., 2005). Europe 
lacks the non-monetary equilibrating mechanisms, such as capital and labor mobility, that are 
found in optimal currency areas, and a greater reliance on relative price and wage changes among 
countries is needed. Countries with persistently high inflation are likely to lose price 
competitiveness unless higher prices are compensated by productivity growth. Developments in 
some eurozone countries—such as Italy or Portugal—seem to fit the pattern of competitiveness 
losses.
5 
Several explanations for the inflation differentials have been put forward, namely, price-level 
convergence, demand pressures, and “structural” distortions (Figure 3). In Annex 2 we review 
these in more detail and estimate the impact of these factors in a two-step generalized method of 
moments (GMM) panel regression. We find that EU-15 inflation during 1996–2005 was 
associated mostly with variability of the output gap and structural reform variables, while the 
price-level convergence variable was not statistically significant; however, its omission generates 
omitted-variable bias. Quantitatively, the output gap of 1 percent was associated with a reduction 
in annual inflation of about 0.3–0.4 percent. More regulation in product or labor markets by one 
sample standard deviation was associated with a rise in inflation, by 0.3–1.0 percent. 
Empirical literature for the EU-15 countries has failed to find strong support for the Balassa-
Samuelson effect.
6,7 Alberola-Ila and Tyrväinen (1998) found that tradable-to-nontradable 
productivity differentials are substantially smaller than those implied by the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect, as nontradables productivity growth has been much faster than thought earlier. As long as 
the productivity growth differentials remain small in the NMCs—as suggested by Égert et al. 
(2005) or Flek, Marková, and Podpiera (2003)—the Balassa-Samuelson effect is unlikely to 
explain fully either inflation or exchange rate appreciation. At the same time, however, a gradual 
change in the relative prices of nontradable goods has been observed in most NMCs. Thus, 
despite the fact that these relative-price changes cannot be linked directly to the productivity 
differentials, central bank forecasting models typically include trend variables to capture 
persistent real exchange rate appreciation.  
The experience of the old member countries provides valuable lessons for new members. Apart 
from the relatively high sacrifice ratio, the impact of past reforms (or a lack thereof) drives 
inflation in the EU-15 countries. The lack of structural reforms may push inflation up in the future 
through two channels: first, through cost-push channels, as a result of either markup or wage-cost 
pressures; and, second, through its impact on the monetary transmission mechanism, by making 
inflation more persistent. 
                                                           
4 See, for example, Angeloni and Ehrmann (2004) and Hofmann and Remsperger (2005). 
5 For a discussion of the ERM 2 regime for a few of the EU-15 countries, see, for example, Bulíř and Šmídková 
(2005). 
6 The Balassa-Samuelson effect is expected to work as follows. Productivity growth in the tradable good sector 
is assumed to exceed that in the nontradable good sector. Assuming further that wages equalize across sectors, 
faster tradables productivity growth pushes up wages in all sectors, thus leading to an increase in the relative 
prices of nontradables. With a fixed exchange rate, the relative-price increase in fast catching-up countries may 
result in an overall price level increase relative to slow-growing countries. 
7 For associated measurement problems see Čihák and Holub (2005). 10   Aleš Bulíř and Jaromír Hurník  
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2. The Phillips curve
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Source: AMECO; World Development Indicators; World Economic Outlook; Conway et.al. (2005); 
authors’ calculations. 
1/ Change in GDP per capita in PPP terms, between 2005 and 1996, relative to Denmark. 
2/ Output gap = actual GDP – potential GDP. Potential GDP is calculated from a Cobb-Douglas 
production function that includes labor, capital, and trend total factor productivity. 
3/ Implied average value for 2001-05. The Maastricht Inflation Criterion: “Saints” and “Sinners”   11 
 
2.4 Taking Stock of the Authorities’ Disinflation Choice: Minimizing Purgatory Pains 
At the onset of disinflation, the national authorities assess the available disinflation tools, and their 
choice of which to use will matter for long-term inflation. The rate of inflation can be brought 
down either permanently by credible monetary policy and market-oriented reforms; temporarily 
by short-term, fiat measures; or by a combination of both. With regard to permanently reducing 
inflation, the authorities establish a low-inflation environment by consistently pursuing price 
stability and gradually embedding low-inflation expectations. As  for temporarily reducing 
inflation, the authorities bring about ad hoc changes in regulated prices and indirect taxes, 
engineer sharp demand contractions to bring inflation down along a short-run Phillips curve, or 
forge a temporary consensus of price and wage moderation. 
In the late 1990s, the authorities in eurozone member countries demonstrated the possibility of 
manipulating the consumer price index through changes in regulated prices and indirect taxation, 
and measures in factor markets. For example, the Irish government was advised to “reduce the 
headline rate of inflation by reducing indirect taxes” (Beggs, 2000). Virtually all EU-15 countries 
engaged in some sort of fiscal or accounting gimmickry in their rush to the euro (Koen and van 
den Noord, 2005; and Ahearne and Pisani-Ferry, 2006). The output costs of pre-euro demand 
contractions were justified by their temporary nature as compared to the permanent benefits of 
eurozone membership. 
The optimal choice of disinflation tools depends of the cost of reforms and benefits of eurozone 
membership, conditional on meeting the inflation target. If the country puts enough weight on the 
benefits of membership, the authorities choose the fiat measures in order to enter as quickly as 
possible with maximum political support (Ozkan, Sibert, and Sutherland, 2004). In contrast, the 
disinflation strategy of long-term structural reforms can be protracted, possibly pushing the date 
of eurozone membership too far off. If, however, the country assigns less weight to the immediate 
benefits of the euro, then the authorities are likely to deliver low inflation by additional structural 
reform measures and fewer fiat measures. The country would then enter the eurozone at a later 
date, but with a healthier economy.  
The choice of disinflation strategies also depends on whether the criterion is “tight” or “soft.” A 
tight criterion will push the authorities toward fiat measures, as the chance of meeting such a 
target would be limited without aggressive steps. In contrast, a soft criterion should, other things 
being equal, push the authorities toward adopting reform measures, as the chance of meeting a 
soft target would be sufficiently high without fiat actions or gimmicks. 
Post-euro developments suggest that the initial choice of the reform-or-fiat disinflation mix has 
had long-term consequences. Structural rigidities, solidified by the use of administrative measures 
in the run-up to the euro, translate into a flatter Phillips curve, making the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism less efficient and future disinflations more costly. While the fiat-measure 
strategy may appear optimal over the short term, the longer-term outcome may be quite different. 12   Aleš Bulíř and Jaromír Hurník  
 
The failure to create a low-inflation environment is likely to push the rate of inflation up over 
time, calling for further rounds of fiat-measure disinflation.
8 
3. How Costly Can Disinflation Be And Why? 
We now build on the above link between structural reforms and the monetary transmission 
mechanism to simulate the cost of disinflation policies. To this end, we build a simple 
country-specific model based on Walsh (2003), asking two questions:
9  
(1) “What output gap—resulting from a monetary policy action—would have been consistent with 
bringing inflation toward the Maastricht criterion?” This is a hypothetical question because 
(i) some of the countries in our sample are already eurozone members and the Maastricht criterion 
does not apply to them; (ii) the eurozone members do not have control over monetary policy; and 
(iii) the NMCs did not (or could not) enter the eurozone at the time point we selected for our 
simulations. The disinflation announcements in the eurozone countries can be thought of either as 
the ECB targeting same disinflation for all countries or as the country leaving the eurozone and 
regaining monetary independence. 
(2) What is the magnitude of the sacrifice ratio for a uniform disinflation shock of 100 basis 
points? Although the exact numerical results of our simulations need not be taken literally, the 
identical model structure enables us to evaluate the long-term costs of disinflation across 
individual countries and link these costs to past disinflation strategies. 
The estimates arguably correspond to an upper limit of plausible levels of the sacrifice ratio. The 
disinflation strategies are not vulnerable to the Lucas critique providing inflation expectations are 
modeled properly, i.e., model consistent (rational) expectations are used. However, if the 
disinflation strategy is supplemented by structural reforms, which may influence the market 
structural characteristics, the parameters that determine the output sacrifice ratio may change. 
These changes are likely to push the sacrifice ratio estimates down relative to our simulations. 
Nevertheless, we see our estimates as a natural benchmark against which disinflations can be 
compared. 
3.1 The Model  
The model consists of five equations that represent aggregate demand, aggregate supply, the 
uncovered interest rate parity condition, term structure, and the policy-reaction function (see 
Annex  2 for further details).The aggregate spending relationship corresponds to the open 
economy version of the traditional IS curve and takes the form: 
t t t t t u q a r a y a y + + − = − − − 1 3 1 2 1 1 ,  (1) 
                                                           
8 For example, in March 2006 the European Trade Union Confederation recommended “a moratorium on 
indirect taxes and administrative prices” to keep inflation below 2  percent (European Trade Union 
Confederation, 2006). 
9 Walsh drew on a variety of models, both for the closed economy case (Fuhrer and Moore, 1995a and 1995b; 
Fuhrer, 1997; and Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997) and the open-economy case (Batini and Haldane, 1999; and 
Svensson, 2000). The Maastricht Inflation Criterion: “Saints” and “Sinners”   13 
 
where y, r, and q are the deviations of log output, the long-term real interest rate, and the real 
exchange rate from their steady state level, respectively; and u  is an aggregate demand shock. 
While we do not know the underlying steady state levels, it is sufficient for our approach to 
assume that they are mutually consistent. Whereas the coefficient  1 a  captures the persistence of 
output behavior, the coefficients  2 a  and  3 a  reflect the impact of the real interest and exchange 
rates, respectively, on economic activity. 
The aggregate supply equation, the Phillips curve, is as follows: 
t t
imp
t t t t t y b E b b b η γ π π π π + + − + − + = − − + − 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 ) 1 ( ) ) 1 ( ( ,  (2) 
where π  is the quarterly change of the price level,  π E  denotes inflation expectations, 
imp π  is 
import price inflation (the sum of foreign inflation and the change of the nominal exchange rate), 
and η  is an aggregate supply shock. Inflation is persistent and can decline either through the 
impact of expectations (b2), a negative output gap (γ), or positive external shocks. The supply 
relationship encompasses multi-period, overlapping nominal contracts, extended beyond the direct 
impact of import prices. The latter is an important feature of small open economies that rely 
heavily on the exchange rate channel of monetary transmission (the exchange rate pass-through 
effect), with the coefficient () 1 1 b −  approximating the weight of imported goods in the consumer 
basket. 
Agents are not fully forward looking and base their inflation expectations both on history and 
currently available information: 
1 1 1 1 1 ) 1 ( − + + − + = t
e
t t t e e E π π π ,  (3) 
where 
e
t 1 + π  represents model-consistent expectations. Expectations for all agents in the economy 
are “rational,” but this does not prevent some of the agents from using the rule of thumb and 
looking at past inflation as well. 
The relationship with the world is captured through the uncovered interest rate parity condition 
that relates the behavior of domestic and foreign interest rates and the nominal exchange rate, 
while exhibiting some persistence:  
t t t t t t prem ir ir c s c s ν + − − − + ∆ = ∆ + ) )( 1 (
*
1 1 1 ,  (4) 
where  s ∆  is the change in the nominal exchange rate; ir  and  * ir  are the domestic and foreign 
long-term nominal interest rates, respectively;  prem is the risk premium; and ν  is an exchange 
rate shock. The coefficient  1 c  determines the level of exchange rate persistence—higher values 
imply less sensitivity to interest rate changes. The long-term rate is approximated by the one-year 
nominal interest rate, while the short-term nominal interest rate is represented by the three-month 
nominal interest rate, which is directly linked to the policy reaction function. Looking forward, 
the long-term rate follows the term structure equation as a simple average of short-term interest 
rates. 
The model is closed by a policy reaction function, the Taylor rule. The monetary authority 
responds to the level of expected inflation; the deviations of expected inflation from a target, π
T; 






t t t y d d d i d i ε π π π + + − + − + = + + − ) ) ( )( 1 ( 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 ,  (5) 
where i is the domestic short-term nominal interest rate and ε  is a policy shock. The monetary 
authority is fully forward looking and thus uses model-consistent inflation expectations, 
e
t 1 + π , in 
its decisions. 
The disinflation path is determined jointly by all elements of the model.
10 Other things being 
equal, disinflation requires an output gap and the inflation sensitivity to the output gap is 
determined by the slope of the Phillips curve, γ. However, disinflation is less painful if the agents 
are forward looking (a small b2 coefficient), or the exchange rate is less persistent (a small c1 
coefficient), or both. To ensure comparability of individual countries, we assume that the weights 
of inflation and output stabilization— 2 d  and  3 d , respectively—in the policy reaction function are 
the same for all countries and equal to ½ (Taylor, 1993), while the policy persistence parameter, 
1 d , is country-specific. 
3.2 Calibration 
The choice of countries is based on their inflation history. We simulate disinflations in four EU-15 
countries with historically high inflation rates: Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Spain; and in five 
NMCs: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.  
The country-specific models are calibrated following the methodology outlined in Coats et al. 
(2003) and Berg et al. (2006). The parameters are based on: (i) economic principles; (ii) available 
econometric and anecdotal evidence; and (iii)  the sensible behavior of the whole model. The 
calibration process is iterative: choosing reasonable parameter values, examining the properties of 
the model next, and changing the parameter values or the structure of the model, until the model 
behaves appropriately.  
First, we replicate the structural-model Phillips curve estimates summarized in Rumler (2005)
 and 
other recent national central bank, ECB, and IMF publications, using the exact values of the 
estimated or calibrated coefficients.
11 Second, we set the remaining parameters to mimic the 
known features of the individual economies, drawing either on the impulse response functions 
from the published central bank models or structural VARs.
12 Both help us to assess the 
underlying dynamics in the countries under consideration. Although the estimates of impulse 
response functions in the NMCs should be taken with a grain of salt, they are useful for designing 
the dynamic properties of individual calibrations. They help us to replicate, for example, the 
strong exchange rate channel in Hungary, the stability of the real exchange rate in Slovenia, or the 
“two-peak” response of inflation to an interest rate shock reported in Poland. 
Given the dual objective of replicating the economies’ stylized facts obtained from the various 
VARs and doing it in comparable manner, the calibrated parameters of the rest of the model 
                                                           
10 See Buiter and Grafe (2001) for a thorough discussion of the transmission mechanism. 
11 Coats et al. (2003), Gavura and Reľovský (2005), Łyziak (2002), Kłos et al. (2005), Jakáb and Kovács (2002), 
van Els et al. (2001), Berben et al. (2004), and Rumler (2005). If an exact estimation or calibration of the Phillips 
curve is missing, as in the case of Ireland, the model structure is calibrated to replicate the responses reported in 
Mojon and Peersman (2001) and Els et al. (2001). 
12 Arnoštová and Hurník (2005), Kuijs (2002), Wróbel and Pawlowska (2002), Vonnák (2005), Ganev et al. 
(2001), and Mojon and Peersman (2001). The Maastricht Inflation Criterion: “Saints” and “Sinners”   15 
 
equations do not necessarily coincide with any particular equation in the literature. Clearly, the 
same set of stylized facts can be captured through an alternative set of calibrations. For example, 
policy persistence can be captured either through the policy reaction function or through the other 
equations in the model. We have chosen the latter option, as this approach allows distribution of 
persistence into different channels, such as the exchange rate, inflation, and so on. Consequently, 
our Taylor rule persistence coefficient is on average only about ½ of that estimated by Clarida et 
al. (1998). As a result, the most variable coefficient in our calibrations is exchange rate 
persistence, capturing directly alternative approaches to exchange rate management by individual 
central banks. The higher the coefficient, the more the central bank was involved in exchange rate 
management. 
The coefficients exemplify the impact of past policy choices. Reform laggards tend to have a 
flatter Phillips curve (Hungary, Italy), while countries with credible monetary policies benefit 
from the forward-looking behavior of economic agents (the Czech Republic, Ireland), and so on. 
We report the main country-specific coefficients in Table 3 and the economies’ characteristics in 
more detail in Annex 3. 
Table 3: The Main Coefficients Used in Country-Specific Models 














1 () a   2 () b   () γ   1 () c   1 () d  
  Old member countries 
Greece 0.60  0.40  0.20  0.90  0.40 
Ireland 0.80  0.70  0.20  0.30  0.40 
Italy 0.90  0.60  0.05  0.40  0.50 
Spain 0.90  0.90  0.10  0.50  0.60 
 New  member  countries 
Czech Republic  0.80  0.50  0.20  0.20  0.50 
Hungary 0.90  0.50  0.05  0.50  0.90 
Poland  0.90 0.80  0.30  0.50  0.40 
Slovakia 0.90  0.50  0.10  0.90  0.50 
Slovenia 0.90  0.70  0.20  0.90  0.50 
Source: Various publications; authors’ simulations. 
 
3.3 Simulations 
Basing calibrations on observed past behavior makes our results open to the Lucas critique, since 
we are asking what the optimal disinflation strategy is, conditional on the past structure of the 
economy and historically observed agents’ response to shocks
13. We find the past-structure 
scenario quite attractive, because it provides a benchmark against which scenarios of a changing 
policy environment can be compared. Of course, there is no a priori reason why the model 
coefficients should remain fixed during the whole disinflation period. We may overestimate the 
                                                           
13 It is only the impact of structural reforms on the market structure, and thus on the structural parameters, that is 
open to the Lucas critique, as expectations are model-consistent.   16   Aleš Bulíř and Jaromír Hurník  
 
sacrifice ratio if the country reforms during the disinflation period or if the agents become more 
forward looking. 
In our first set of simulations—“what output gap would have been consistent with bringing 
inflation toward the Maastricht criterion?”—the monetary authority announces a lower (credible) 
inflation target equivalent to the Maastricht inflation criterion. The announcement specifies the 
target only, letting the authorities choose a disinflation path consistent with the lowest possible 
costs, given its reaction function. The magnitude of the disinflation announcement depends on 
inflation observed at the time of the announcement and the value of the Maastricht criterion at that 
time.
14   
The starting point of our simulations is the assumption of a typical transmission period: the 
disinflations in our simulations start six quarters before the particular country has had inflation at 
or below the criterion for the last time. In countries that have yet to meet the criterion—Hungary, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia—the disinflation starts six quarters before the end of our data sample; the 
same rule is applied for Greece, whose inflation did not satisfy the criterion during 2001–2005. 
The five-year disinflation trajectories and associated cumulative output gaps are thus fully 
model-dependent (Figure 4 and Annex 3). 
While the disinflation costs in term of lost output are relatively low for the old member countries, 
given that their required disinflation was only 90 basis points on average, they are much larger for 
such high-inflation NMCs as Hungary or Slovakia. For example, Ireland’s disinflation of 
170 basis points would require sacrificing only about ½ percent of GDP during the next five 
years. In contrast, disinflations of 300 basis points and 600 basis points in Hungary and Slovakia 
would require sacrificing a whopping 7  percent and 12  percent of GDP, respectively. These 
results reflect a much less effective transmission mechanism in the two countries, but it is hard to 
imagine that the national central banks could justify such a disinflation strategy or that their 
policies would not become more credible in due course. In contrast, the three remaining NMCs 
show relatively small output losses: ¾ percent of GDP in the Czech Republic and Poland and 
3 percent in Slovenia. 
In our second set of simulations we normalize the disinflation shock to 100 basis points for all 
countries, thus avoiding the complication of different initial disinflation announcements. 
Following Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999), we cumulate the associated output gap over both the 
three-year horizon and the full simulation horizon (Table 4). While our model does not allow 
calculation of confidence intervals, our simulation results are broadly similar to structural-model 
estimates of the sacrifice ratio for some countries from our sample. (Table A.3.3). 
                                                           
14 We exclude Italy, which had inflation below the criterion during 1999–2005. It is worth noting that Italy’s 
2002–2005 cumulative output gap was equivalent to -2 percent of GDP. The Maastricht Inflation Criterion: “Saints” and “Sinners”   17 
 
Table 4: The Sacrifice Ratios in a 100-Basis Point Disinflation (In percent of GDP) 
  Old member countries  New member countries 
Cumulative 
output gap  Greece Ireland  Italy  Spain  Czech 
Republic  Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia 
12-quarter  -1   ⁄10  - 1   ⁄10   -½ -¼  -1   ⁄10   -¾ -½ -¾ -⅓ 
Full-horizon  -¾  -½  -3 ½  -1 ¾  -½  -4  -¾  -¾  -1 ⅓ 
Source: Authors’ simulations. 
 
Figure 4: The Disinflation Path and Cumulative Output Gap (In percent) 
Greece 
Disinflation from 3.2 percent to 2.6 percent 











Cumulative Output Gap 
 
Ireland 
Disinflation from 4.6 percent to 2.9 percent 
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Spain 
Disinflation from 3.0 percent to 2.6 percent 












Cumulative Output Gap 
 
Czech Republic 
Disinflation from 3.9 percent to 2.7 percent 












Cumulative Output Gap 
 
 18   Aleš Bulíř and Jaromír Hurník  
 
Hungary 
Disinflation from 5.5 percent to 2.6 percent 
















Disinflation from 3.1 percent to 2.0 percent 











Cumulative Output Gap 
 
Slovakia 
Disinflation from 8.6 percent to 2.7 percent 












Cumulative Output Gap 
 
Slovenia 
Disinflation from 5.2 percent to 2.7 percent 












Cumulative Output Gap 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The output losses differ across countries and across simulation horizons, conditional on the 
stability of simulation coefficients. First, across countries, disinflation does not seem very costly 
in the Czech Republic, Ireland, and Poland, whereas the costs appear very high in Hungary and 
Italy and only marginally smaller in Slovenia and Spain. Second, across time horizons, while the 
three-year and full-horizon output losses are quite similar in the Czech Republic, Ireland, Poland, 
and Slovakia, the long-run losses are a multiple of the short-run losses in Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Slovenia, and Spain. These differences can be attributed to the speed of the exchange rate pass-
through as well as to the interest rate sensitivity of the exchange rate.
 In some countries, such as 
Hungary and Poland, the direct exchange rate channel helps initially to decrease inflation 
relatively quickly; however, further disinflation remains costly when this channel is exhausted The Maastricht Inflation Criterion: “Saints” and “Sinners”   19 
 
(see the detailed charts in Annex 3). Thus, the point about passing through purgatory on the way 
to the euro may have some validity after all (Buiter, 2004). 
While the magnitude of the output losses is mostly persistency-related, this persistency cannot 
be  solely attributed to the structural characteristics of the individual economies. The 
unemployment–inflation trade-off changes over time depending on monetary policy credibility 
(Laxton and N’Diaye, 2002). Thus, the large output losses in Hungary can be attributed to the 
limited credibility of national monetary policy, which has not been able to bring inflation 
systematically below 5 percent since 1990, and which disinflated from double-digits only in 2001, 
some five years later than in the Baltics and the Czech Republic. A similar argument can be made 
for Slovakia and Slovenia. In the eurozone countries, however, given the existence of a common 
monetary policy, the results should be attributable fully to the structural characteristics of the 
respective economies. 
Our results for the selected EU-15 countries, most notably Italy and Spain, seem to be consistent 
with the policy choice of “low inflation now, reforms later.” On the one hand, their short-term 
costs of disinflation are relatively modest, mainly because of “borrowed credibility” from the 
ECB. On the other hand, their long-term costs are high, reflecting structural rigidities inherited 
from the past. In their rush to the euro, these countries set aside reforms that would ultimately 
have left their economies more flexible and better prepared for future disinflations. In contrast, 
Ireland’s economy seems more flexible and disinflations ought to be relatively painless over the 
long run. 
4. Policy Implications 
The policy relevance of the Maastricht inflation criterion has been unfairly downplayed. The 
criterion has had a profoundly positive impact on the public stance toward inflation and a less 
positive impact on the choice of instruments to achieve the desired inflation outcome in the run-up 
to the euro. EU member country authorities have known that inflation can be brought down either 
by short-term, fiat measures or by long-term, market-oriented reforms, or by a combination of 
both. While the former instruments are virtually costless in terms of domestic political capital, the 
latter can be costly, especially in economies with longstanding rigidities supported by influential 
political groups. 
The choice between fiat and reform disinflation strategies is affected by the definition of the 
Maastricht inflation criterion. A tight definition of the criterion may tilt the NMCs toward the fiat-
measure strategy, as the chance of meeting a tight target may seem limited without aggressive fiat 
measures. A softer criterion, in contrast, would make the long-run reform strategy more likely to 
succeed and, thus, more likely to be selected by the authorities. The fiat strategy may seem 
particularly attractive to countries that expect to benefit immediately from the euro, or that assign 
a high discount factor to the future because, for example, the leading political party faces 
reelection. Short-term benefits of the euro would come either from lower fiscal borrowing costs 
(Greece and Italy), reduced current account vulnerability (the Baltics), or from the ECB’s 
low-inflation credibility (Italy, Hungary, and Slovakia). The benefits of lower interest rates, 
however, are not relevant for most NMCs—their public debt to GDP ratios are one-half or less 
compared with those of Greece and Italy in the 1990s. However, as the ratio of public debt to 
GDP continues to increase in some NMCs, they may find this benefit attractive after all. 20   Aleš Bulíř and Jaromír Hurník  
 
The choice of whether to reform or not affects, however, both future inflation and the cost of 
future disinflations. On the one hand, regulated markets with high markups and labor costs 
generate inflationary impulses. On the other hand, economies with nominal rigidities tend to have 
inefficient monetary transmission mechanisms, and inflationary impulses need to be extinguished 
with larger output gaps. Although a country opting not to reform may succeed in lowering 
inflation temporarily, it will fail to address the underlying cost-push factors. Moreover, its 
sacrifice ratio would remain high, making future disinflations costly.
15 Having said that, some 
countries may still be better off by opting for fiat measures, especially if the ECB’s credibility 
makes agents more forward looking.
16 
A rush toward low inflation would be costly both for the NMCs and for the ECB. It is not clear 
that all of the NMCs need (or would gain) monetary policy credibility. Moreover, even if such 
credibility gains were achieved in Hungary or Slovakia, would it be worth the output losses 
implied by our simulations? The long-term risks associated with a premature and fiat-driven entry 
into the eurozone are similar to those faced by some old member countries—stalled reforms, 
inflexible economies, and real exchange rate appreciation following euro adoption. The long-term 
impact on the ECB can be costly as well. The tighter the Maastricht inflation criterion, the more 
NMCs will choose the fiat measures, postponing structural reforms and worsening the eurozone 
transmission mechanism, with an adverse impact on ECB decision making. 
Building on the above results, we draw two implications for the Maastricht inflation criterion. 
First, inclusion of economies with large negative output gaps in the three best performers has 
made the inflation criterion unnecessarily tight, providing incentives for fiat disinflation measures. 
It would seem preferable to exclude countries with negative gaps from the calculation, or to 
calculate the average inflation rate over the full length of the business cycle. This could be a 
relatively undemanding change—estimates of the output gap are published regularly by the EU 
(the AMECO database). Second, the short, 12-month testing period during the ERM2 period may 
further stimulate the NMCs to use the fiat strategy. A longer testing period, covering the full 
business cycle, would seem more appropriate. 
5. Conclusions 
The Maastricht inflation criterion has been an influential nominal rule for the past 15 years. It has 
helped reduce inflation dispersion among the EU countries to levels last seen in the 1960s, even 
though it could not prevent a gradual increase in inflation in some countries in the 2000s. While 
the criterion influences positively the public stance toward low inflation, it biases the choice of the 
disinflation strategy toward fiat measures in countries that have a lot to gain from the euro. These 
countries tend to opt for “low inflation now, reforms later,” which yields low inflation instantly at 
the cost of postponing structural reforms and preserving comparatively high sacrifice ratios. 
While the purgatory of the ERM2 can be made relatively painless by fiat measures, such a 
                                                           
15 It has been argued that “[...] measures, including reductions in indirect taxes and freezing administered prices, 
will not slow the momentum of underlying inflation and wage dynamics. Moreover, capping administered prices 
would entrench the current distorted price structure” (International Monetary Fund, 2005). 
16 Greece provides a good example of an improved transmission mechanism despite only modest reforms and 
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strategy is likely to result in inefficient transmission mechanisms and costly disinflations, 
complicating ECB decision making.  
The main contribution of the paper is finding empirical support for the link between the choice of 
disinflation strategies and disinflation costs. While disinflation does not seem very costly in 
countries that tend to be labeled as reformist, say, the Czech Republic or Ireland, the costs appear 
much higher in reform laggards, say, Hungary or Italy. To this end, we formulate a simple 
macroeconomic model, calibrate it using the available empirical results for the Czech Republic, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain, and simulate the output 
consequences of disinflation strategies. We find that—using past performance and assuming 
stability of our coefficients—the implied sacrifice ratios differ across countries and across the 
simulation horizons. These differences stem from the slope of national Phillips curves, 
expectations formation, and the level of output, inflation and exchange rate persistence. 
Our results suggest two potential changes to the definition of the Maastricht inflation criterion. 
First, calculate it so as to avoid the influence of the business cycle, which periodically makes the 
criterion very tight. Second, lengthen the period for the criterion evaluation to avoid reliance on 
fiat disinflation strategies. 
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Appendix 1 
The Maastricht Inflation Criterion: A Short History Lesson 
The Maastricht inflation criterion was designed as one of the instruments to stabilize the European 
currencies in preparation for the euro.
17 Following the oil shock of 1973, Europe experienced 
great nominal divergence, which thwarted further progress toward economic and political 
integration. When the nominal anchor of semi-fixed exchange rates failed, the European 
authorities decided to set simple and understandable targets that would constrain fiscal and 
monetary policies in the EU. 
The European exchange rate mechanism (ERM) was introduced by the European Community in 
March 1979—as part of the European Monetary System (EMS)—to reduce exchange-rate 
variability and achieve monetary stability in Europe, in preparation for Economic and Monetary 
Union and the introduction of a single currency, the euro. While the new system set up various 
institutional instruments to prevent exchange rate movements outside a pre-specified level, 
macroeconomic conditions soon undermined it. The dispersion of inflation rates increased 
steadily, peaking in the mid-1980s, and the differential between low-inflation and high-inflation 
countries remained in double digits until 1991.  
Diverging inflation rates and the associated volatility in real exchange rates made the quest for 
stable currencies elusive. Periodic adjustments raised the values of strong currencies—especially 
the Deutschmark—and lowered those of weaker ones. While during the late 1980s changes in 
national interest rates were used to keep the currencies within a narrow range (2.25 percent), the 
system eventually collapsed in the early 1990s owing to the differing economic policies and 
conditions of its members. 
The collapse of the ERM spurred further coordination among EU member countries, which 
surrendered some of their monetary independence. The euro was established by the provisions in 
the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union: in order to participate in the new currency, 
member states had to meet budget deficit, debt ratio, inflation, and interest rate criteria.
18 The 
inflation criterion was eventually defined as “an average rate of inflation, observed over a period 
of one year before the examination, that does not exceed by more than 1½ percentage points that 
of, at most, the three best performing Member States in terms of price stability” 
                                                           
17 In this paper, when referring to the European Union prior to 2004, we have in mind the so-called EU-15, 
comprising Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. For the sake of simplicity we ignore some 
countries that participated in various associated arrangements but were not members of the EU. 
18 These macroeconomic conditions were specified in Article  109(j) of the Maastricht Treaty 
(http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtec.pdf) and the inflation criterion read: “the achievement of a high 
degree of price stability; this will be apparent from a rate of inflation which is close to that of, at most, the three 
best performing Member States in terms of price stability.” 28   Aleš Bulíř and Jaromír Hurník  
 
(European Central Bank, 2004).
19,20 In 1999, ERM2 replaced the original ERM, while the original 
criteria were retained. 
In May 2004, 10 new countries were admitted to the European Union (EU): the Czech Republic, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Seven of the 
NMCs—Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia—entered the ERM2 in 
2004 and 2005 and their inflation performance will be assessed accordingly. 
                                                           
19 The ECB interprets the Treaty provisions as follows. First, the inflation rate is calculated using the increase in 
the 12-month average of the harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP) over the previous 12-month average. 
Second, the notion of “at most, the three best performing Member States in terms of price stability,” is applied 
by taking the unweighted arithmetic average of the rate of inflation of the three EU countries with the lowest 
inflation and adding 1½ percentage points to that average. Third, negative rates of inflation, as in Lithuania in 
2004, are excluded from the average. 
20 See Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) for an early justification of the inflation criterion. The Maastricht Inflation Criterion: “Saints” and “Sinners”   29 
 
Appendix 2 
The Factors of Inflation in EU-15 Countries 
Several explanations for the differentials have been put forward, namely, price-level convergence, 
demand pressures, and “structural” distortions. We review these in turn and reflect them 
subsequently in our simulations. 
1.  Inflation and the level of economic development 
It has been observed that the average price level and the level of economic development are 
closely correlated—prices of nontradable goods and services tend to be substantially lower in 
countries with lower per capita GDP and vice versa. Thus, as the relatively poorer countries’ 
income converges toward that of relatively richer countries, faster inflation in the initially poorer 
countries can be expected to bring the two price levels into line. Historically, the relationship has 
been close to unity: an increase in GDP per capita in purchasing power parity units relative to the 
EU average by 1 percent corresponds to an increase in the price level relative to the EU by 0.7–
0.9 percent  (Čihák and Holub, 2005). This adjustment can be effected either through higher 
domestic inflation (and a stable currency vis-à-vis the euro) or through nominal appreciation of 
the domestic currency (and a stable rate of inflation vis-à-vis the eurozone). Of course, the 
nominal appreciation channel is partly closed for countries in the ERM 2 regime and fully closed 
for eurozone countries—exchange rate fluctuations are limited during the ERM  2 and the 
currency is fixed thereafter. 
The income level differentials seem to be a long-lasting source of future inflation—on current 
trends, the differentials are expected to close only in 10–25 years (Čihák and Holub, 2005). 
Arguably, this type of convergence-driven inflation is taken care of in the Maastricht criterion. 
The safety margin of the criterion—1½ percentage points above the rate of inflation in the three 
best-performing member states—should take care of most of this change in the price level. 
Indeed, most recent studies estimating the Balassa-Samuelson effect have not found its impact at 
above 1½ percentage points annually (see Mihaljek and Klau, 2006, for a review), although the 




2.  Inflation and aggregate demand 
Aggregate demand fluctuations seem to explain a substantial part of the EU-15 inflation 
differential. Low inflation comes at a cost—disinflations tend to be associated with output below 
its potential as the economy moves along a short-run Phillips curve. During 2001–2005, a 
cumulative output gap of more than 1 percent of GDP relative to the average was associated with 
inflation lower than the EU-15 average by 0.1 percent. The gap–inflation nexus in the NMCs has 
been, predictably, much less tight than in the EU-15 countries, reflecting two factors. First, 
several of the NMCs went through periods of massive disinflations that necessitated substantial 
                                                           
21 While capital inflows generate consumer booms and price pressures, exchange rate appreciation pushes 
inflation down through the import price channel. In some countries, e.g., the Czech Republic or Poland, the latter 
channel has offset the former channel. 30   Aleš Bulíř and Jaromír Hurník  
 
demand contractions. Second, measurement problems continue to plague the national accounts in 
many NMCs.  
The member states’ cyclical stance is not taken into account in the calculation of the Maastricht 
criterion, making the criterion at times unnecessarily tight (Buiter, 2004; and Schadler et al., 
2005). While the inflation rate in the three best-performing countries averaged about 1 percent 
during 1999–2005, in the early 2000s this rate hovered below 0.5 percent and in the mid-2000s 
below 0.8 percent. During these periods, the fast-growing ERM 2 countries would have had to 
engineer relatively strong demand contractions in order to meet the Maastricht criterion. Some of 
the new member central banks have resigned themselves to the need for tight demand policies in 
the run-up to the euro: for example, the Slovak National Bank (2005) in its inflation forecast for 
2007–2008, announced that “monetary conditions should, however, throughout the period remain 
moderately restrictive so as to avoid the complete closing of the output gap.” 
3.  Inflation and market regulation 
The EU countries have differed substantially in their approach to market-oriented reforms and 
these differences affect both the generation of cost pressures and their transmission to consumer 
prices, creating potentially the most problematic of the three channels of inflation. Countries with 
more protected product and labor markets have had higher average inflation rates than those with 
less protected markets. Regarding product markets, protected economies tend to have both higher 
markups and a slower pass-through of external price shocks to consumer price inflation.
22 The 
countries that lagged behind the most in 1998 (France, Greece, and Italy) still did not bring their 
level of product market protection in 2003 to the median level (Conway et al., 2005). Regarding 
labor markets, trade unions in protected economies have exercised strong wage pressures, 
manifested in fast growth in unit labor costs (e.g., Italy). The progress toward less labor market 
protection has been even less pronounced, and labor markets have become actually less flexible in 
several EU-15 countries, offsetting EU policies of wage moderation (OECD, 2004; and Estevão, 
2005). 
Structural reforms—such as those that increase competition in domestic factor and product 
markets—tend to result in lower long-term inflation. This mechanism can operate either directly 
through smaller markups and more intensive price competition, which keep prices pressures in 
check, or indirectly through expectations formation, as agents in flexible economies tend to have 
more forward-looking expectations than agents in economies without such flexibility. As a result, 
economies with forward-looking agents tend to have less costly disinflations (Laxton, and 
N’Diaye, 2002).  
4.  Quantitative results 
We find that EU-15 inflation during 1996–2005 was associated mostly with variability of the 
output gap and structural reform variables, while GDP per capita was not statistically significant. 
We estimated a panel regression of average inflation on relative PPP GDP per capita; a measure 
of the GDP gap; and various measures of structural reforms undertaken during this period in 
product market, administrative, and labor market regulation. To avoid potential simultaneity—for 
example, from inflation to the level of development and back to inflation—the panel is estimated 
                                                           
22 See Angeloni and Ehrmann (2004), Bayoumi et al. (2004), and Honohan and Lane (2003). The Maastricht Inflation Criterion: “Saints” and “Sinners”   31 
 
as a two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) regression, with appropriate instruments 
(see Table A2.1). 
Inflation in EU-15 countries is explained mostly by differences in individual countries’ cyclical 
stance, although regulation in product and labor market matters as well. Quantitatively, the output 
gap of 1 percent has been associated with a reduction in annual inflation of about 0.3–0.4 percent. 
More regulation in product or labor markets by one sample standard deviation has been associated 
with a rise in inflation, by 0.3–1.0 percent. Although we could drop GDP per capita from the 
equation on statistical grounds—the coefficient is statistically insignificant—its omission 
generates omitted-variable bias. We note, moreover, that the coefficients are comparable with 
those in Čihák and Holub (2005). 
The experience of the old member countries is instructive in several respects. Apart from the 
relatively high sacrifice ratio, the impact of past reforms (or a lack thereof) drives inflation in the 
EU-15 countries. The lack of structural reforms may push inflation up in the future through two 
channels: first, through cost-push channels, as a result of either markup or wage-cost pressures; 
and, second, through its impact on the monetary transmission mechanism, by making inflation 
more persistent. 
 32   Aleš Bulíř and Jaromír Hurník  
 
Table A2.1.  Determinants of European Inflation, 1996–2005 
This table reports the results of panel regressions for EU-15 countries excluding Luxembourg. 
The dependent variable is the annual rate of inflation. GDP per capita is measured in PPP terms 
and is expressed as a ratio to Denmark’s GDP (World Development Indicators database). The 
output gap is measured in percent of potential output (the production-function-based estimate in 
the AMECO database). Product market, administrative, and labor market regulation variables are 
based on data in Conway et al. (2005) and OECD (2004) respectively; observations are linearly 
interpolated. The index of regulation gives a weight of one-third to each variable. The estimation 
technique uses a two-step GMM, with one lag for instruments. Other instruments are the 
trend-based output gap and U.S. dollar GDP per capita relative to Denmark. 
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Product market regulation  1.91** 
(3.81)      
Administrative regulation    0.237 
(1.57)    
Labor market regulation 
 
  0.671* 
(2.09) 
 
Index of regulation       0.980* 
(2.41) 
        
Country fixed effects 










2  0.70 0.66  0.68  0.68 
Observations 140  140  140  140 
   
Note: t statistics in brackets. 
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent. 
 





This annex details the model specifications and individual country calibrations. In addition, it 
presents extended graphs of simulated disinflation trajectories.  
The model specification takes the form:
23 
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where equations (1) to (9) represent aggregate demand, aggregate supply, import price formation, 
inflation expectations formation, uncovered interest rate parity, the policy reaction function, the 
interest rate term structure, the Fisher equation and real exchange rate formation, respectively. 
Tables A3.1 and A3.2 define the model variables and detail the country-specific calibrations. The 
values of the steady-state variables are normalized to zero and so are foreign inflation and interest 
rates. It follows that the steady-state level of the domestic nominal interest rate equals inflation 
(the steady-state level of the real interest rate is equal to zero) and the same holds for the steady-
state level of the nominal exchange rate change. The latter simply equals the difference between 
domestic and foreign inflation. 
The parameters are calibrated following the methodology outlined in Coats et al. (2003) and Berg 
et al. (2006). First, we replicate the Phillips curve estimates summarized in Rumler (2005). 
Second, we set the remaining parameters to mimic the known features of the individual 
economies. Below we summarize the salient features of the simulated economies that we reflected 
in our calibrations. 
The old member states differ substantially in the observed persistence of their economies and in 
expectations formation. Greece is a low-persistency economy with respect to IS and Phillips curve 
persistency. The financial markets are, however, mostly backward looking, with persistent 
exchange rates. Ireland’s monetary policy reacts quickly and forcefully, mostly through the 
exchange rate channel. Although output is not much affected by monetary policy shocks, the 
gap-to-inflation nexus is comparatively strong. Italy appears to have a highly persistent economy 
with a flat Phillips curve. This persistence is compensated only partly by reactive monetary policy 
                                                           
23 The model was simulated in MATLAB, using the IRIS computing environment. Further details are available 
on request. 34   Aleš Bulíř and Jaromír Hurník  
 
(low persistence in policy rates). Spain seems to be a highly persistent economy, but the Phillips 
curve is somewhat steeper than that of Italy.  
The NMCs exhibit comparable persistence of their real economies and inflation, but they differ in 
the slope of their Phillips curves (i.e., monetary policy credibility), and in the forward-looking 
behavior of their financial markets (i.e., persistency in the exchange rate). 
The Czech Republic is not particularly flexible, but the persistence is offset by a steep Phillips 
curve and largely forward-looking financial markets. Hungary has the least favorable monetary 
policy environment in our sample. A flat Phillips curve is accompanied by a mostly backward-
looking element in exchange rate behavior. Moreover, the latter is buttressed by sluggish 
monetary policy reactions. Poland  has a quick direct exchange rate channel, which is 
supplemented, with a lag, by the traditional output gap channel. This yields the specific 
“two-peak” response of inflation to a monetary policy shock reported in the literature. Slovakia 
exhibits mostly backward-looking behavior in the financial markets and monetary policy reactions 
are sluggish. Such persistency is only partially compensated by the Phillips curve, the steepness of 
which is below the sample average. Slovenia displays similar traits of backward-looking behavior 
in the financial markets, which calls for comparatively long-lasting policy effects. However, 
Slovenia’s Phillips curve is steep, diminishing the cost of disinflation. 
Table A3.1.  Model Variables 
 
t y   the deviation of the log output from its steady state level 
t r   the deviation of the long-term real interest rate from its steady state level 
t q   the deviation of the real exchange rate from its steady state level 
t π   inflation, quarter-to-quarter change of the price level 
1 + t t E π   inflation expectations 
e
t 1 + π   model consistent inflation expectations 
imp
t π   the rate of growth of import prices 
t s ∆   the change in the nominal exchange rate 
t i   the short-term (three-month) nominal interest rate is also the policy rate 
t ir   the long-term nominal interest rate  
*
t π   foreign inflation 
*
t ir   the foreign long-term nominal interest rate 
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Table A3.2.  Parameter Calibrations 
Parameters Greece Ireland Italy Spain  Czech 
Republic  Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia
1 a   0.6 0.8  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
2 a   0.2 0.1  0.2  0.3 0.25 0.05  0.1 0.1 0.1 
3 a   0.1 0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
1 b   0.9 0.6  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 
2 b   0.4 0.7  0.6  0.9  0.5  0.5 0.8 0.5 0.7 
γ   0.2 0.2  0.05  0.1  0.2  0.05  0.3 0.1 0.2 
1 m   0.6 0.4  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.3 0.0 0.6 0.0 
1 e   0.9 0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
1 c   0.9 0.3  0.4  0.5  0.2  0.5 0.5 0.7 0.9 
1 d   0.4 0.4  0.5  0.6  0.5  0.9 0.4 0.9 0.5 
2 d   0.5 0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
3 d   0.5 0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
1 f   0.5 0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
In Figure A3.1 we report in greater detail the graphs of the country-specific disinflation trajectories, 
adding the interest and exchange rates, and output gap to the information presented in Figure 3. 
Table A3.3.  Empirical Estimates of the Sacrifice Ratio 1) 
(In percent of GDP)   
Author  Country or group of 
countries  
Period of 
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identified disinflation period, 
conditional on assumptions regarding 






















The ratio is estimated using Phillips 
curve regressions. 
Cuñado and de 
Gracia (2003) 
Ireland 
Spain  1960–2001  0.9 
1.7 
The ratio is estimated using Phillips 
curve regressions. 
Diana and 
Sidiropoulos (2004)  Ireland 1960-90  Between 0.4 and 
0.9 
The ratio is estimated during 
identified disinflation period, 
conditional on assumptions regarding 
the output gap. 
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1) The sacrifice ratio is defined as the cumulative GDP loss associated with 100 basis point disinflation. 36   Aleš Bulíř and Jaromír Hurník  
 
Figure A3.1.  Disinflation Trajectories 
Greece 
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Figure A3.1.  Disinflation Trajectories (Continued) 
Czech Republic  
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Figure A3.1.  Disinflation Trajectories (Concluded) 
Slovakia 
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